INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN AND THE RISE OF CONFLICTS DURING INDONESIA'S EARLY STAGE OF DEMOCRATISATION[1]

Ketut Gunawan[2]

Abstrak

Artikel ini membahas peningkatan jumlah konflik politik di Indonesia dari perspektif institutional analysis. Penulisnya berargumen bahwa, pertama, peningkatan jumlah konflik yang sangat drastis terjadi pada masa-masa awal demokratisasi. Kajian teoritis dan data-data empiris disodorkan untuk mendukung argumen ini. Kedua, meningkatnya jumlah konflik tidak dapat dilepaskan dari adanya institutional breakdown yang terjadi sebagai implikasi dari pergantian rezim/demokratisasi. Absennya institusi atau dibuatnya institusi pengganti tapi tidak viabel dalam merespon ketegangan yang meninggi di masa transisi membuat terjadinya semacam kevakuman institusi dalam penanganan konflik. Ini melahirkan situasi yang kondusif bagi merebaknya konflik di seluruh pelosok nusantara ketika itu, sebab opportunity costs atau opportunity risks untuk melakukan kekerasan sangat kecil, dan bahkan tidak ada sama sekali.

Keywords: *regime change, democratisation, institutional breakdown, conflict, violence, Indonesia.*

A. Introduction

The collapse of New Order regime in May 1998 changed the situation and entailed a change in the power constellation. A common syndrome of regime change from authoritarian to democratic state power is that the state becomes paralytic politically and bankrupt economically. Pereira *et.al.* maintained that with this syndrome, new democracies faced double challenges, that is, to resume economic growth and to consolidate democracy. The state's efforts concerning structural adjustment programs and the stabilisation of the economy are frequently hampered by the "vast expectations of economic improvement" drawn upon by the population

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and the vulnerability of the new government to popular pressures and demands of interest groups and lobbies. Furthermore, daily political life and the competitive electoral cycle scotch any attempt of producing long-term programs (Pereira *et.al.* 1993, see also Gill 2000). In the political sector, the state's capacities—particularly in penetrating society, regulating social relationship, and appropriating or using resources in determined ways (Migdal 1988)—eroded. The state is unable to arrange or establish a new and prompt institutional mechanism where all groups must advance their interests and demands through appropriate channels. In the transition period, democratic institutions are unable to "offer the politically relevant groups incentives to process their demands within the institutional framework" (Pereira *et.al* 1993:5). This is the case because reforms mostly bring about a decline in material condition and consumption, at least in a transitional period.

Post-New Order Indonesia—particularly just after the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime—exhibited exactly these problems: Economically, the new government faced a severe economic crisis for quite a long period of time, making it unable to improve the material condition of the population. The people found themselves in financial straits due to a skyrocketing price of most basic commodities. The number of poor people increased by nearly 400% in 1998 (from around 20 millions to nearly 80 millions). Politically, the paralysis of state coercive power evoked the euphoria of *reformasi* (reformation, political reform)—euphoria of freedom—among Indonesian people. Any state's attempted intervention in the expression of this freedom movement was ignored since this was regarded as maintaining or introducing an authoritarian style in directing people's aspirations. In this new situation, there was no appropriate distributional conflict mechanism (cf. Pereira *et. al*, 1993); "the rules of the political game [were] uncertain" (Gill 2000:45). As a result, widespread riots and lootings took place soon after Soeharto's fall. This incident portrayed the acute political and economic problems faced by the state and the population.

In the ensuing months, the situation was aggravated even further by ethnic, religious, and communal conflicts and violence. These conflicts were not only driven by ethnic or religious hatred, but also triggered by trivial cases. The number of violent incidents across the country jumped tremendously. The cost of this violence was tremendous: Thousands of people died, tens of thousands of people took "internal" refuge, thousands of private and public properties and facilities were damaged.

The rise of conflicts in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime was an interesting phenomenon. This phenomenon stimulated curiosity to investigate. Hence, this study attempts to answer the questions arising from this phenomenon: In which period after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime were the conflicts on the rise? If specified, why were the conflicts on the rise during such a period?

This article argues that, first, the conflicts were on the rise during the so-called Indonesia's early stage of democratisation. Second, institutional breakdown is a crucial variable responsible for the rise of conflicts during that period. To support the arguments, this study analyses the conflict phenomenon from the perspective of institutional analysis. The data used are qualitative and quantitative data collected through documentary research. Some data are also drawn from empirical findings collected during my fieldwork.

To provide a vivid picture of the rising conflict phenomenon, this work firstly presents a theoretical framework. It is employed to provide a foundation of the study. Prior to discussing the core mechanism on the relationship between institutional breakdown and the rise of conflicts, this study sketches what and how repressive political institutions were broken-down, which is then followed by the description of skyrocketing conflicts after regime change in archipelago.

B. Theoretical Framework
B.1. Regime and Regime Change

In the Dictionaries, a regime is defined as "a form of government," "a government in power," "a prevailing social system or pattern,"[3] a "mode or system of rule," a "character of government,"[4] or "the organization that is the governing authority of a political unit."[5] Thus, besides referring to the rule, regime terminology is used to refer to the body or organisation. The term regime referring to body or organisation, and even actor, is also found in 16 definitions of political regimes provided by researchers that were collected by Munck (1996). Peter Calvert, for instance said that "[a] regime is the name usually given to a government or sequence of governments in which power remains essentially in the hands of the same *social group*." Michael Mann suggested that a regime is "an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power *actors,* coordinated by the rulers of the state." T.J. Pempel maintains that "a regime's character will be determined by the *societal coalition on which a state rests,* the formal powers of that state, and by the institutionalization and bias of the public policies that result" (emphasis by Munck; quoted in Munck 1996). These definitions reflect a variety and even an overarching concept of "regime." This raises concerns among political scientists as Munck suggests that "very rarely do regime analysts stop to define what they mean by political regime and even more rarely do they actually consider how the definition of political regime they implicitly or explicitly adopt can serve as a tool to organize their inquiries" (Munck 1996).

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[3] *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, Fourth Edition, 2000, published by Houghton Mifflin Company.
[4] Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1996, 1998 MICRA, Inc.
[5] Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913), http://dict.die.net/regime/

In the study of democracy or democratisation, the terminology of "regime" or "political regime" is usually used to refer to the rules (formal or informal), not referring to the body, organisation, or actor. Laurence Whitehead stated that "[t]he term 'political regime' denotes a defined set of institutions and 'rules of the game' that regulate access to, and the uses of, positions of public authority in a given society" whereas Stephanie Lawson insisted that "[t]he concept of regime is concerned with the form of rule... [R]egimes embody the norms and principles of the political organization of the state, which are set out in the rules and procedures within which governments operate." Scott Mainwaring suggested that "Regime...is a broader concept than government and refers to the rules (formal or not) that govern the interaction of the major actors in the political system. The notion of regime involves institutionalization, i.e., the idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their behavior accordingly." Last but not least, Guillermo O'Donnell maintained that "[t]he regime is the set of effectively prevailing patterns (not necessarily legally formalized) that establish the modalities of recruitment and access to government roles and the criteria for representation and the permissible resources that form the basis for expectations of access to such roles" (quoted in Munck 1996).

This research uses a definition of regime commonly used in the study of democratisation as a form of rule imposed by those in power that govern the society. Thus, Soeharto's regime in this work means Soeharto's rule, Habibie's regime means Habibie's rule, authoritarian regime means authoritarian rule, and democratic regime means democratic rule. Similarly, Soeharto's authoritarian regime means Soeharto's authoritarian rule, Wahid's democratic regime means Wahid's democratic rule, and so forth.

Regime change therefore refers to the change from one form of rule to another form of rule. Regime change may occur due to the change from one authoritarian regime (rule) to another authoritarian regime (rule). However, it may also occur due to a change from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. Similarly, a regime change also counts in a change from a democratic regime to another democratic regime. In this work, what I mean by "regime change" is the change from authoritarian regime (Soeharto's regime) to democratic regime (post-Soeharto's regime).

B.2. Democratisation and Early Stage of Democratisation

Since the publication of Huntington's *The Third Wave of Democratization* (1991), there has been a growing number of studies examining the democratisation phenomenon across the globe. However, there is no single and ultimate definition provided by researchers or even a provision of precise criteria for democratisation (Huntington 1991; Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993; Koppel 1993; Snyder 2002) and of the "borderline" between liberalisation and democratisation (Linz and Stepan

1996; Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993; Koppel 1993), democratic transition and democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999, Haynes 2001, O'Donnell 1997, Bertrand 2002), democratising states and mature democracies (Snyder 2000), and so forth.

Among definitions given by researchers, democratisation has been used both in a broad sense of the term (Huntington 1991, Snyder 2000, Bertrand 2002) and in a specific sense of the term (Linz and Stepan 1996, 1997, 2001; Qadir, Clapham, and Gills 1993; Koppel 1993). The former refers democratisation to a whole process beginning from the collapse of the authoritarian regime to the establishment of a consolidated democracy (from liberalisation to democratisation, from democratic transition to democratic consolidation, from democratising state to mature democracy). In this definition, phrases such as "initial phase of democratisation," "initial stage of democratisation," "early stage of democratisation" (Snyder 2000), or "transitional phase of democratisation" (Mansfield and Snyder, quoted in Huntington 1997) are introduced, although the longevity of the initial/early stage or transitional phase of democratisation is not taken into consideration. The latter refers democratisation to "a wider and more specifically political concept" compared to liberalisation (Linz and Stepan 1996). The definition of liberalisation and democratisation are introduced to understand the processes of democratic transition and democratic consolidation. However, as mentioned above, the "demarcation" between democratic transition and democratic consolidation as well as between liberalisation and democratisation is still vague or debatable. Moreover, the *precise* relationship between liberalisation-democratisation and democratic transition-democratic consolidation remains unclear. Is liberalisation typically found during democratic transition? Is it impossible that democratisation can be found during democratic transition? (cf. Bertrand 2002).

This study uses the term "democratisation" in its broad sense, embracing both the collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime as well as the current democratic regime. Thus, it includes terms as "liberalisation" and "democratisation" as well as the terms "democratic transition" and "democratic consolidation." In assessing the phenomenon of the rise of conflict, emphasis is placed on the period of democratic transition and democratic consolidation, hence focusing on the period in which the conflict was on the rise, whether during democratic transition or democratic consolidation. The terms "initial stage/phase of democratisation" and "transitional period of democratisation" are used to refer to the democratic transition period, while the period of democratic consolidation is labeled as "consolidated stage/phase of democratisation."

In order to attain a comprehensive picture of Indonesia's democratisation, Bertrand used the term "democratisation to include both the periods of transition and consolidation" (Bertrand 2002). Concerning the "demarcation" between democratic

transition and democratic consolidation in the Indonesian case, he introduced the following working definition of democratic transition:

> The period of democratisation began in May 1998. After three days of rioting in Jakarta and other major cities of Indonesia, President Suharto resigned and his Vice-President, B.J. Habibie, was sworn in as President…Legislative elections were held in June 1997 and presidential elections in October of the same year…After October 1999, one can argue that Indonesia continued a democratic transition or entered a period of democratic consolidation. If one takes the minimal definition of transition, it ended with the election of new parliament and Abdurrachman Wahid as president, especially since opposition political parties made gains.[6] By other accounts, such as Linz and Stepan's definition, the transition was not over. The military continued to play an important role in the polity and even maintained appointed seats in the country's highest governing body, the People's Consultative Assembly (Bertrand 2002:12).

And in respect to democratic consolidation, Bertrand suggests:

> In July 2001, after months of political wrangling between the national legislature and President Wahid, the latter was impeached because of an alleged corruption scandal by a process that followed dubious legal procedures. Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had been Wahid's Vice President, was sworn in as President. Despite the questionable process of Megawati's accession to power, it can be argued that Indonesia entered a period of democratic consolidation at that time. The military remained important but did not challenge Megawati's presidency despite a period of high uncertainty. Although Megawati appeared to become closer to the armed forces after a few months in power, her presidency allowed for much deepening of the democratic process, including significant constitutional amendments and reforms that continued to limit the military's ability to intervene with civilian process (Bertrand 2002:12).

Thus, even if taking Bertrand's assessment into account, the period of democratic transition can still be "discussed." However, a working definition is required for analytical purposes, which is used in this work to assess in which period

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[6] Although Megawati's party won the 1999 election, Wahid was elected/appointed President by People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). A free-election was held on 7 June 1999 and the President was appointed in October 1999; thus, there was a four-month long gap. This is one reason (besides Bertrand's explanation) why the "demarcation" between liberalisation and democratisation is vague in the Indonesian case.

the conflict was on the rise. Based on the above explanation, this study uses a working definition as summarised in the following table.

Table 1. Regime Change and Democratisation in Indonesia

No	Regime Types	Period	Longevity	Phase/Stage	Process
1.	Soeharto's Regime (Authoritarian Rule)	11 March 1966 – 21 May1998	32 years	Authoritarian	Authoritarian
2.	Habibie's Regime (Democratic Rule)	21 May 1998 – 20 October 1999	17 months	Early stage of democratisation	Democratic Transition
3.	Wahid's Regime (Democratic Rule)	20 October 1999 – 23 July 2001	21 months	Early stage of democratisation	Democratic Transition
4.	Megawati's Regime (Democratic Rule)	23 July 2001 – 20 October 2004	39 months	Consolidated stage of democratisation	Democratic Consolidation
6.	Yudoyono's Regime (Democratic Rule)	20 October 2004 – present	9 months*	Consolidated stage of democratisation	Democratic Consolidation

* Until July 2005.

Thus, the period of early democratisation in Indonesia refers to of the rule of the democratic transition period, namely the Habibie and Wahid regimes (May 1998-July 2001). Therefore, what I mean by conflict during early stage of democratisation is the conflict which occurred during the *period* of Indonesia's early stage of democratisation or democratic transition, that is, between May 1998 and July 2001.

B.3. Regime Change, Democratisation, and Institutional Breakdown

Democratisation could occur due to the willingness[7] of the existing authoritarian regime to democratise (democratisation by design) (Snyder 2000) or due to the sudden collapse of the authoritarian regime (democratisation by "accident") (Huntington 1991). In the Indonesian case, democratisation occurred due to sudden collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian regime. In order to gain popular supports, Soeharto's successor, Habibie, was compelled to liberalise/democratise the political system. Habibie's steps in liberalising/democratising politics were later deepened by his successors, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and

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[7] The willingness may be caused by pressures from the elites' inner-cycle or from the society.

Susilo Bambang Yudoyono. Thus, the regime change preceded democratisation in Indonesia.

Interestingly, both incidents (regime change and democratisation) evoked the same phenomenon, that is, a breakdown of the authoritarian rule of Soeharto. This is also called a breakdown of authoritarian political institutions or, put simply, an institutional breakdown. For the purpose of analysing the association of these events with conflicts, the terms "regime change" and "democratisation" will be used interchangeably to 'refer to' the breakdown of the authoritarian political institutions (i.e. the institutional breakdown) in Indonesia.

In this work, such a breakdown is scrutinised from the perspective of institutional analysis, which defines institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990:3). This definition clearly distinguishes between institutions (abstract ones) and organisations (concrete ones), which is a shift from the vague common definition of institutions (defined as both abstract and concrete things). The body, actors, or players (such as political parties, universities, faculties) are clearly defined as organisations, while institutions refer to the rules of the games that govern the interaction between actors or players. Institutions can be both formal (laws, policies, doctrine, regulation, formal codes of conducts) and informal (convention, norms, informal codes of behaviour, customs) (North 1990). Thus, the breakdown of authoritarian political institutions or institutional breakdown means the breakdown of New Order's authoritarian rules of the game.

C. Institutional Breakdown during Indonesia's Early Stage of Democratisation

Any authoritarian governments used certain mechanisms or institutions to suppress dissents and other conflict potentials. In other words, they have anti-conflict machines. What institutions were used by the New Order government as the anti-conflict machines? To find out, an examination of the (neo)patrimonialist system where Soeharto's personal rule formed the center of the system provides an adequate starting point. According to Crouch, in a (traditional) patrimonialist system,

> the ruler's power depended on his capacity to win and retain the loyalty of key sections of the political elites. Lacking sufficient coercive capacity to enforce acceptance of his rule, the ruler sought to win voluntary allegiance by satisfying the aspirations—especially the material interests—of his supporters through the distribution of fiefs and benefices in exchange for tribute and loyalty. The government was able to rule in the interests of the elite without taking much account of the interests of the masses because the latter were poor, socially backward, political passive, and kept in check by regime's military forces. Politics thus took the form of a struggle within the elite itself, among rival factions and cliques that were concerned principally with gaining

influence with the ruler who determined the distribution of the rewards of office. The ruler was able to maintain his authority by preserving the balance among the competing cliques (Crouch 1979).

Thus, a (traditional) patrimonialist system could survive "as long as the masses remained politically quiescent, and rivalries within the elite were contained so that they did not threaten its basic unity of interests" (Crouch 1979). However, it is difficult to attain this fact as the system would sooner or later be affected by the changes outside the system or by the presence of new opportunities and constraints imposed within the system. Modernisation is an influential factor. As Crouch stated, "modernisation has brought new challenges that threaten the capacity of governments to meet demands and maintain stability. Economic change has produced new social groupings and classes with distinctive political interests, while the political quiescence of the masses has been undermined and modern political organization has enabled leaders to mobilize support on a wide scale" (Crouch 1979). Growing challenges and threats make the stability of the system vulnerable, particularly concerning distribution problems, the balancing of rivalries between elites, and the skepticism of the impatient society. In order to deal with this phenomenon, the authoritarian government had to adjust the existing system. The renewed or more modern patrimonialist system that was later created is called neo-patrimonialism, described as a "modern state exhibiting patrimonial characteristics" (Crouch 1979).

In many neo-patrimonialist regimes, it has been found that the regime capacity to meet demands grows. Its capacity to cope with threats also increases, "in part through the increasing sophistication of the means of coercion" (Crouch 1979). In the case of the New Order regime, Soeharto's government imposed mass depoliticisation to deal with the masses. Regarding the elites, Soeharto co-opted military and civilian elites, including the emasculation of political parties. The strategies used by the Soeharto administration ranged from blatant oppression to sophisticated means of coercion (e.g. Pancasila Democracy, implanting the military's dual function doctrine into Indonesia's "body", monoloyalty of civil servants, Soeharto's Annual State Address, slogan of "Development, Yes – Politics, No," etc.) (Gaffar 1992, 1999; Eriyanto 2000; Heryanto 1993; Gunawan 1996). All of these depoliticisation methods were carried out under Soeharto's personal guidance and control. Mackie did not exaggerate by claiming that the New Order regime was

> a more personalistic form of authoritarian rule, dominated by the quite singular capacity of President Suharto to impose his own distinctive stamp on the political system. The characteristics of his mode of government combine a curious mixture of a traditional sultanistic court and of a technocrat's rational administration, as well as of an avuncular paternalistic *bapak* and a ruthlessly

authoritarian military leader accustomed to being obeyed, of a very modern man and yet a still highly traditional one, of the outwardly Muslim and the inwardly syncretist Javanese (Mackie 1989:24).

According to Crouch, a patrimonialist system can maintain itself if two conditions are met. The first demands that "the elite must be ideologically homogeneous, so that the struggle for power centers on the allocation of private material benefits rather than an alternative political programs," whereas the second demands that "the mass must continue to be passive and isolated from the political process" (Crouch 1979:579). However, the New Order regime faced problems regarding these "requirements". In regard to the first "requirement" (the elite), "the New Order government's dependence on economic growth seems to require an administrative system based on the bureaucratic values of predictability, regularity, order, and rationality—in contrast to patrimonial favoritism and arbitrariness." And in regard to the second "requirement" (the mass), "there are doubts as to the long term effectiveness of the Indonesian regime's efforts to depoliticise and isolate the masses." In view of such problems, Crouch predicted that "it [was] therefore likely that the stability of the New Order government [would] be increasingly challenged, forcing it to turn much more to straightforward repression in order to deal not only with opposition from the masses, but also from within the elite" (Crouch 1979:579). Crouch's prediction proved to be right in the following years and even decades.

Facing personal rule and succession problems, Soeharto had eventually begun to institutionalise his personalistic neo-patrimonialist system by creating the "New Order pyramid" which can be described as "a steeply-ascending pyramid in which the heights are thoroughly dominated by a single office, the presidency. The president commands the military which is *primus inter pares* within the bureaucracy, which in turn holds sway over the society" (Liddle 1985)." Liddle describes as follows:

(1) What is being institutionalized is the "New Order pyramid": a dominant presidency, a politically active armed forces, a decision-making process centered in the bureaucracy, and a pattern of state-society relations that combine cooptation and responsiveness with repression. Unlike the Huntington model, political parties, including the government's own Golkar, are not central institution in this system.

(2) The key promoter of institutionalization in New Order politics is Soeharto himself. His policies have been remarkably consistent and successful over two decades. By design and by accident these policies have created an identifiable pattern of political expectations, anchored in a powerful structure of interests, affecting present and future presidential, armed forces', and bureaucratic behaviour.

(3) Nonetheless, the level of institutionalization is low and must be seen in the context of the continuing force of some elements of personal rule.
(4) Though the New Order appears to have shifted from a system of personal rule to an institutionalised "presidential-military-bureaucratic complex," there is still much room for the idiosyncratic behaviour of an incumbent president to shake the structure" (Liddle 1985:70-71).

What Soeharto had built was a system to respond to rapid changes in Indonesian society as well as to anticipate future challenges. In this system, Soeharto dealt with three main elements of the New Order polity, that is, the military, the bureaucracy (including Golkar), and the masses. These elements were designed in a certain manner so that they were supportive to the regime and to Soeharto in particular. Thus, the anti-conflict machines of Soeharto's regime lied within these elements. They were, more specifically, a repressive security institution, a repressive bureaucratic institution, and a mass depoliticisation institution.

During his reign, Soeharto effectively used such institutions to deal with the masses and potential conflicts. Immediately after his fall, however, these institutions had broken-down completely. The following part discusses the breakdown of these institutions during the regime change process and the early stage of democratisation.

C.1. *Repressive Security Institution*

In order to guard the country, maintain stability and political order, secure development programs, and preserve authoritarian rule, the New Order government established the ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) whose total forces were accounted for 500,000 by 1995. ABRI was composed of the Army, the Marines, the Air Force, and the Police Force. The inclusion of the Police Force into ABRI was one strategy to control all Indonesian security forces by one single ABRI Commander. In fact, during the New Order era, the ABRI Commander was member the military (Army) as well as Soeharto's loyalist.

To control the entire Indonesian territory, the military established Territorial Commands paralleling civilian bureaucracy across the archipelago. The structure of the military's territorial commands stretched from regional, provincial, district, sub-district, to village level. As Table 4 shows, the jurisdiction of each military command varies depending on the size of the areas and/or geopolitics. Jakarta and East Java, for instance, hold one Regional Military Command respectively (Kodam Jaya and Kodam Brawijaya respectively). In the meantime, all provinces in Kalimantan (East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan and West Kalimantan) also only hold one Regional Military Command (Kodam Tanjung Pura). At village level, one Babinsa (Village Guidance Non-Commissioned Military Officer) may be responsible for one village or a cluster of villages.

Table 4. Parallel Structure of Military Commands and Civilian Bureaucracies

Military Command	Civilian Bureaucracy
Kodam (Regional Military Command)	Regional (Cluster of Provinces), Province
Korem (Resort Military Command)	Province, Sub-Province (Cluster of Districts)
Kodim (District Military Command)	District
Koramil (Sub-District Military Command)	Sub-District
Babinsa (Non-Commissioned Military Officer)	Cluster of villages, Village

In order to parallelise the military-civilian structure, the military established the Provincial Muspida (Council of Provincial Leaderships) at provincial level whose members consisted of a military commander, a Governor, a chief of the police force, a chief prosecutor, and a head of court. At district level, the establishment is called District Muspida (Council of District Leaderships). These councils, both at provincial and district level, were always chaired by a military commander. At the Sub-district level, the council has been named Muspika (Council of Sub-District Leadership), consisting of a Sub-District Military Commander, a Sub-District Police Chief, and a Sub-District Head (Gunawan 1996).

In view of this structure (military organisation), political scientists such as Harold Crouch argued that "the position of the military command is no less than a shadow government at every level of government" (*Forum Keadilan*, 23.10.1995, in Gunawan 1996:36).

During the New Order regime, ABRI also created some special and extra organisations such as Opsus (Special Operation) and Kopkamtib (later became Bakorstanas, Coordinating Board for Assisting in the Consolidation of National Stability). These organisations were terrifying military organisations in the eyes of democratic forces since their activities were mostly directed towards controlling and dismantling the opposition and any kind of democratic movement (Gunawan 1996).

In order to support such organisations, ABRI established the *dwifungsi* ABRI (dual function). Dwifungsi was a military doctrine proposed by Gen. Nasution in 1958, claiming that the Indonesian Armed Forces exercised a dual role, that is, as a defence force and a socio-political force. As a defence force ABRI was responsible for defence affairs against external threats, as a social force it was responsible for any matters stretching from ideological, political, economic, and socio-cultural issues to spiritual and religious spheres (Notosusanto 1975). By means of this doctrine, New Order government not only created a homogenous ideology among officers and personnel, but also justified its intervention in non-military sectors (Jenkins 1983,

1984; Crouch 1988; Sundhaussen 1982).

The dual function is a formal ideology-based institution aiming at justifying its intervention in non-military sectors in general (Jenkins 1983, 1984). At a practical level, ABRI established an informal institution, the-so-called *pendekatan keamanan* (security approach institution). The core tenet of the security approach institution was to give security considerations top priority in any issues, whether it was directly related to public order and political issues or not. Hence, people's prosperity, justice and human rights were victimised.[8] For instance, the military was generally present in land disputes between farmers and companies as well as labour disputes between employees and employers in order to provide 'security assistance' for the companies (*Forum Keadilan,* 20.10.2002).

This parallel structure of military organisation as well as the institutions imposed by the New Order government "not only provided the military with a formidable capacity to control the civilian bureaucracy and direct the result of, for instance, general elections, but also provided opportunities to spy on and control people's political activities in any region" (Gunawan 1996:36-37). At the local/village level, the role of the Muspika, particularly the sub-district military command and Babinsa were critical. The Muspika (the sub-district head, the sub-district police chief and the sub-district military commander) was designed to be ready to provide prompt security assistance to those who served governmental or military interests. The Babinsa could act as an intelligence service or to represent the presence of the military in the area. The presence of such a military organisation and mechanism at the local/village level had largely prevented the people from staging mass action during Soeharto's New Order.

During the *reformasi* era (after the fall of Soeharto), the military organisation has changed slightly. Extra-military organisations such as the Bakorstanas and the Litsus have been abolished. The Police Force has been separated from the Army, the Marines, and the Air Force; the Indonesian armed forces of ABRI (the Army, the Marines, the Air Force, and the Police Force) has been renamed to TNI (Indonesian National Military; the Army, the Marines, and the Air Force). The structure of the military commands, including the Babinsa, remains unchanged. During Wahid's administration, some Regional Military Commands (Kodam) were abolished, but during Megawati's regime, some of them were re-established as part of the strategy to "tame" the military. The abolishment of the Kodams by Wahid did not change the parallel structure of military commands with that of civilian bureaucracy.

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[8] The debate on this issue appeared in the national media in the 1990s. Democratic forces called for a change from the application of the security approach (*pendekatan keamanan*) to deal with people's lives to that of the prosperity approach (*pendekatan kesejahteraan*). It was argued that security approach merely neglected human rights issues, while the prosperity approach would force the state apparatus to appreciate human rights, besides people's prosperity.

However, the biggest change occurred to the military institutions. The institutions of the anti-conflict machines—the *dwifungsi* and the *pendekatan keamanan*—of the New Order regime had broken down. First, the rise of civilian supremacy was followed by the "abandonment" of dual function doctrine (*Tempo*, 19-25 May 2003). Although there has been no statement from the military concerning the revocation of the dual function institution, the military has obeyed civilian rule. In other words, the dual function doctrine was informally abolished.[9] The informal revocation of dual function doctrine/institution implies that the military no longer has legitimacy or justification to exercise its past practices (military intervention in politics). Second, since Habibie came to power as successor of Soeharto, the military has revoked its security approach institution. This was a response to people's demands after the media, NGOs, etc exposed its past human rights violation. The revocation of security approach institution has prevented the military to act arbitrarily against the people or democratic forces.

C.2. Repressive Bureaucratic Institution

Another important strategy of the New Order government to control the population was through the establishment of a politicised, centralised, and repressive bureaucracy. This kind of arrangement also made it easier for the New Order to penetrate the bureaucracy and to control its elites (Gaffar 1992, 1999; Sosialismanto 2001). This was because, quoting Liddle, "the bureaucracy pervades society. In every city, towns, and village it is the largest employers." And secondly, "the bureaucracy also dominates government, in the sense that bureaucrats are the most powerful actors in most policy conflicts" (Liddle 1985).

From an organisational standpoint, the promulgation of the Law 5/1974 on Local Government and the Law 5/1979 on Village Government was the most important step. Although Law 5/1974 recognised local autonomy, local governments did not have significant autonomy due to the control system imposed in Central-Local Government power relationships, financial relationships, and supervision relationships. High dependency of local governments on the central government, particularly regarding financial relationships, made the Central Government's grips to Local Governments strong (Kaho 1982, 1988; Gunawan 1990/1991).[10] By Law

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[9] The military currently never talks about *dwifungsi*. Instead, the military insists its neutral position in the competitive electoral cycle as well as its adharance to civilian rule. However, numerous military's foundations that run business still exist. Seemingly, this is one reason why the military is not in a position to release its formal statement to revoke *dwifungsi*. Because of this, in commemorating the fifth anniversary of the *reformasi* movement (May 2003), student rallies still demanded "to revoke socio-political function of the armed forces and police force" (*Tempo Interaktif*, 19-25 May 2003).

[10] Research conducted by Gadjah Mada University (Faculty of Social and Political Sciences) and the Ministry of Home Affairs in 35 district governments in Central Java covering the period of

5/1979, village bureaucracies across the archipelago were uniformised regardless of their specific condition (adat tradition). Adat organisation was also integrated into the village bureaucracy, i.e. in the LMD (Village Consultative Council) whose Chairperson was a Village Head (Warren 1990). It was intended to support growth-based economic development. However, it also made easier to control local people through village bureaucracy.

From an institutional perspective, particularly in relation to New Order's anti-conflict machines, the regime imposed two institutions, namely, the *Monoloyalitas* (monoloyalty) of the civil servants and the *Golkarisation* of the bureaucracy. Both were inseparable but distinguishable. Both were aimed at homogenising the ideology of civilian elites in the bureaucracy as well as the civil servants themselves.

As far as the *Monoloyalitas* institution is concerned, all civil servants in the bureaucracy apparatus must be loyal to Soeharto's government. Some loyalty-related obligations were imposed to the civil servants, but a vivid feature was that civil servants had to be loyal to the government's party (Golkar). They were encouraged to be formal members of Golkar and to take part in Golkar activities. As a result, many bureaucrats became incorporated into the party's cadre at many levels. This was particularly to control civil servants in the New Order's bureaucracy apparatus.

Concerning the control of non-civil servants (as well as civil servants), the *Golkarisation* institution was an effective tool. In this regard, Liddle points out:

> In the New Order's first parliamentary election, in 1971, military-civilian hostility ran deep. Golkar was imposed by the military on the civilian bureaucracy, whose members were required to persuade their subordinates and the general public to vote for it. The party's electoral organization in the regions was typically staffed by army officers and civil servants, with the former in the higher positions. The Department of Defense made it clear to its regional officers that the military was to be watchdog and enforcers of "Golkarization" (Liddle 1985:82).

By the implementation of the *Golkarisation* institution, Golkar was integrated into the bureaucracies, both at top (central government) and low level (villages). For instance, Boileau (1983:23) stated that "Golkar is closely identified with the entire structure of the government." He observed that although "the structures of government and Golkar are so closely intertwined as to be distinguishable at the local level, [i]nvariably, the local government official and the Golkar officials are the same person, since by law all civil servants are required to be members of Korpri.

1980/1981-1985/1986 found that financial dependencies of the local governments amounted to 47.89% - 89.11% (Kaho 1988). In East Kalimantan, financial dependencies of provincial government and six district governments in 1990/1991 amounted to 37,91 % - 75,01% (Gunawan 1990/1991).

Korpri, together with ABRI, are the major components of the *Keluarga Besar Golongan Karya* – (The Great Golkar Family)" (Boileau 1983:23). *Golkarisation* was particularly important to the village administration as the Village Head and the entire village apparatus were mostly filled by non-civil servants. In order to deal with them, they were appointed as Golkar's affiliates and encouraged to *golkarise* the village. In order to make it effective, the "carrots and sticks" mechanism was employed. Village Heads would be rewarded if they succeeded in winning a landslide victory for Golkar in the election. Otherwise, they would be punished either by replacement or by other arrangements. This was to buy support from the Village Heads as well as the local people. By means of the Golkar cadres in the village, the government could also control local people. The *Camat* (Sub-District Head) and the Village Head could use the provision of formal letters, good behaviour statement, and ID card arrangements as "points of entry."

Recapulating, it can be said that with such institutions at hand, the regime could not only control civilian elites and civil servants in the bureaucracy sector (*Golkarisation* and *Monoloyalitas*) but also to control local people (*Golkarisation*).

Following the downfall of the New Order regime, there has been a relatively considerable change in the bureaucracy sector in terms of organisation. Generally, the government structure (organisation) from the top to village level remained unchanged. The name of Provincial and District Government *de facto* are the same. However, there has been a change in the relationship among central, provincial, and district governments due to the promulgation of the 1999 Local Government Law, which grants considerable autonomy to local governments (provincial and district governments) and the district government is no longer subordinated to the provincial government but is directly responsible to the central government. Another change is the increased number of provincial and district governments due to the rise of political regionalism across the archipelago. Accordingly, the number of "dissidents" or potential "dissidents" in the Indonesian bureaucracy increased.

In terms of institutions, the monoloyalty and Golkarisation institutions have been formally abandoned. In fact, civil servants are prohibited from becoming party's members. In case civil servants intend to pursue their career through political parties, they should quit as civil servants. In addition, the heads of government agencies and village heads can no longer force their staffs and their people respectively to win Golkar and to obey their former patrons.

C.3. Mass Depoliticisation Institution

In order to depoliticise the masses, the New Order government ran a mass depoliticisation "project." According to Crouch, "a first step toward depoliticization was a result of the massacres that followed the attempted coup of October 1, 1965" (Crouch 1979). It was gauged that between 200 thousand to 2 million Indonesian Communist Party's (PKI) activists and sympathisers were executed, and about 200

thousand were arrested. In the following years, about another 300 thousand were arrested (Crouch 1979). The crucial effect of this action was that "the elimination of the PKI not only removed the most important source of mass mobilisation that had arisen before 1965, but served as terrifying warning to those who might have been inclined to seek mass support for radical causes during the period of the New Order" (Crouch 1979).

After Soeharto assumed power on 11 March 1966, particularly after he was formally appointed President in 1968, Soeharto targeted political parties. He postponed the election from 1969 to 1971, giving him time to design a new party system and to subdue the existing political parties. A new military/government-sponsored party named Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Functional Group) was introduced. In the 1971 election, only 10 parties were allowed to compete, including Golkar. In this election, Golkar surprisingly won 63% of the votes as a newcomer, which spawned wide protests regarding its victory. Crouch wrote that "although it lacked a party organization at the local level, the Golkar was backed by the government's civilian and military apparatus; many voters were subjected to blatant military pressure during the campaign" (Crouch 1979).

The next step was to promote and implement the so-called floating mass (*massa mengambang*). The floating mass can be viewed from an organisational perspective and an institutional perspective. From an organisational perspective it is associated with the establishment or reorganisation of political parties, while from the institutional perspective, it is associated with the mechanisms employed in order to depoliticise the masses.

Hikam states that the floating mass was one of the most important strategies of the New Order in order to execute its politics of depoliticisation (Hikam 1999). The floating mass terminology was promoted and widely discussed after the 1971 general election, and formally implemented in the 1977 election. According to Alfian, this terminology was adopted from the United States. In the American version, the voters are designed to be "floating" before they go to the polls so that the pendulum of the election results can swing to any particular side in the last minute. The floating mass is program oriented and occurs voluntarily (Alfian 1986), meaning that the people can still have links with a political party. In the Indonesian concept, the floating mass concept was introduced to replace the ideology-based party system (*partai aliran*) with a program-oriented party system. However, it was not exercised voluntarily but was highly regulated by the government. In this concept, "the bulk of the population, especially the villagers, should "float" in relation to political parties" (Amal 1992:129). Party branches were prohibited to exist below District administration and villagers' political preferences should be expressed every five years in the election. From the New Order government's political point of view, "between elections they should not be disturbed by politics or agitation." According to Amal, this was intended to remove "the basis of parties' political supports at the government level,"

which was merely to cut a link between the masses and the political parties. In addition, it was intended to ensure that "the hierarchical command of the New Order government would reach into the village without party interference" (Amal 1992:129).[11]

The impact of the floating mass was threefold. First, New Order's floating mass paved the way for political manipulation, and Golkar was the only party that could take the advantages from such arrangements. This was pertinent to Golkar's presence in the bureaucracies at all levels where the bureaucracy was merely a political mobilisation machine that could reach the masses at the village level (Hikam 1999). Second, the people had no significant political freedom. They were encouraged and even forced to vote for Golkar. This was particularly important in rural or remote areas. Third, the floating mass mechanism was successful in depoliticising the masses, making them politically passive or apathetic. Their political activities only took place every five years, namely in the general election. With this institution (floating mass) at its disposal, Golkar won every election during the New Order era with voting margins amounting about 70% at the national level (Budiardjo 2001); therefore, Soeharto's government was stable.

After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesian democratic forces demanded the abandonment of the floating mass system. Hikam maintained that depoliticisation through floating mass had destroyed the Indonesian political foundation and the possibility to a road to democracy (Hikam 1999). Surprised by the people's euphoria concerning the *reformasi* movement, but also with a view to garnering support from the population, President Habibie signed laws abandoning floating mass practices (Law on General Election and Law on Political Parties in particular). In the new laws, ideology-based parties were allowed to exist, and all parties were admitted to have branches, reaching down to the village level.

From an organisational perspective, the abandonment of the floating mass system had a thorough impact on the establishment and particularly on the activities of the political parties. Soon after the new laws were enacted, 148 parties were established prior to the 1999 election. However, the number of parties that eligibly competed in the election only amounted to 48. The general election held on 7 June 1999 brought surprising results. Golkar, which always won in any general election

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[11] To make the mechanism working, the New Order government further regulated the organisational structure of the political parties by continuing the emasculation of political parties. While only 10 parties were allowed to compete in the 1971 election, only three parties were allowed to compete in the 1977 election. *PNI, Parkindo, Partai Murba, IPKI*, and *Partai Katolik* were forced to merge as Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) while NU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti were forced to merge as United Development Party (PPP). Golkar remained as it was (c.f. Liddle 1978).

during the New Order era, was defeated by the PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle) chaired by Megawati Soekarnoputri. Golkar votes plunged from 62%-76% during the New Order elections (1971-1997) to 25 percent in 1999. The PDI(P), which received 2-14 percent of the votes during Soeharto's regime, won a landslide victory, 33 percent of total votes, in the 1999 election (www.kpu.go.id, 2004). Although Golkar has been in second position, the election results mirrored a great impact of the abandonment of the floating mass system on the political organisation, particularly the constellation of political parties. The PDIP gained most seats in Parliament and the new political parties, particularly the Islamic parties, gained significant shares in the distribution of seats.

Prior to the election, most political parties carried out their political activities at the village level and attempted to garner support from villagers. However, the establishment of permanent party's branches below the District level was a big problem faced by most Indonesian political parties, including the big parties such as PDIP, Golkar, PPP, and PKB. It seemed that the party's budget was the main impediment. The difference is that during the New Order era party's cadres and sympathisers other than Golkar were scared to reveal their organisational affiliation to political parties, whereas during the *reformasi* era they have been no longer afraid to disclose their affiliation to or memberships of political parties publicly (other than Golkar).

From an institutional perspective, the effects of the abandonment of the floating mass system have been substantial. One example is the acquirement of greater freedom by political parties in carrying out their political activities in the villages. Although many political parties do not have branches in the villages, they enjoyed freedom to attract villagers by many means. Second, a lifting of the floating mass system means a lifting of mass depoliticisation. This opens up a wider space for the expression of the people's political freedom. From the masses' point of view, the acquirement of new freedom means the acquirement of a greater freedom concerning their political preferences in the election as well as a greater freedom to express their aspirations generally without having to take many risks. *Reformasi* was viewed as freedom to act and freedom to ignore the government's policies, actions, and sanctions perceived as using New Order's approaches or an authoritarian style. In many cases, *"reformasi"* even became a powerful word used to justify people's unilateral action against the elements of the New Order regime or perceived oppressors.

D. The Rise of Conflicts during Indonesia's Early Stage of Democratisation

It is undoubtedly that regime change or democratisation in national politics had a significant impact on society. It implicated state-society relations and society-society relations. During the New Order regime, the society was generally depoliticised and co-opted by the state. The hegemonic power of the state

(Sosialismanto 2001; cf. Gaffar 1992) shaped the state-society relations where the power gap between the state and the society was so wide. Migdal's prominent explanation on the "strong state-weak society" phenomenon (Migdal 1988) accurately describes the state-society relations during the New Order regime. With the collapse of this regime in May 1999, state power decreased tremendously, and even became paralytic. In contrast, the society became more powerful vis-à-vis the state during the *reformasi* era due to the newly acquired "energy". During the transition period the state-society relations were characterised by a "weak state-strong society" phenomenon. Accordingly, the power gap constellation changed; society's power outperformed state power, or at the very least, the power gap was not as wide as before. The increasingly powerful society and the paralysis of the state during the transition period provoked the society to challenge the state (state apparatus, policies, symbol, etc) or its past allies and protected parties (Golkar, companies, etc.). The society's challenges against the state increased the tension between the two. Moreover, the high-energy mass politics led to an increased aggressiveness. Numerous community groups were easily mobilised to attack other groups or actors perceived as enemies. They problematised any past unilateral conflict resolution or suppression imposed by other community groups. This condition was a catalyst for the increase of communal tensions. Increasing communal tension was becoming worse as the society ignored or no longer trusted the paralysed state, particularly its apparatus.

In this situation, the rise of conflict was inevitable. There are many types of conflicts which may emerge during critical situations, but they can be grouped into two main categories, namely violent conflicts and non-violent conflicts.

In regard to violent conflicts, which is the focus of this study, the so-called vertical conflict (state-society conflict) and the horizontal conflict (society-society or communal conflict) emerged after Soeharto's fall. The rise of vertical conflict did not only occur in Aceh, West Papua, and East Timor (Bertrand 2002), but also in most other provinces. Clashes between the community and the state apparatus as well as the destruction of the state's symbols and the public infrastructure dominated the state-society conflict during this period (Tadjoeddin 2002). In regard to horizontal conflict, religious conflicts, ethnic conflicts, civil commotion, street violence, riots, and the like were widespread. Among these, the violent clashes between Moslems and Christians in Maluku and Poso, the bloody conflicts between the Dayak/Melayu and the Madurese in West Kalimantan, and between the Dayak and the Madurese in Central Kalimantan were the worst conflicts in Indonesian history after the 1965/1966 massacres. In short, almost all big islands, big cities and populated areas suffered from growing frontal conflicts and anarchy due to lawlessness and the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms in a new political setting. The conflicts cost thousands of lives, forced thousands of people to take refuge, and damaged thousands of houses, the public infrastructure, and other private facilities (Sihbudi

and Nurhasim 2001, Tim Peneliti LIPI 2001, Ecip and Waru 2001, Surata and Andrianto 2001, Sunarlan 2002).

Tadjoeddin set up a database on violent incidences or cases of such violent conflicts during the period of 1998-2001 (democratic regimes). He also collected data on the cases occurred between 1990 and 1998 (authoritarian regime). He grouped the violent cases into four categories. First, communal violence, consisting of: 1) ethnic violence, religious violence, and violence caused by migration; 2) the May riot (riot in May 1998, just before the fall of Soeharto); 3) the food riot (due to the severe economic crisis prior to Soeharto's fall); 4) political views violence (violence due to differing political views, mostly among supporters of political parties); 5) competing resource violence; 6) *dukun santet* violence (the killings of those allegedly having capabilities of exercising black magic); 7) civil commotion violence, and 8) other violence. Second, separatist violence, namely violence evoked by the separatist movement in Aceh and West Papua. Third, state-community violence, that is, violence between state apparatus and the community. Fourth, industrial violence, referring to violence in industrial relations, mostly violence directed against the companies (Tadjoeddin 2002). Of these, the Indonesian media and observers categorised communal violence as "horizontal" violence/conflict since the violence prevailed between the communities. "Vertical" violence/conflict was the terminology used to refer to state-community violence as well as to separatist violence. Industrial violence seemed to be in a grey area of these two categories.

As Table 2a and 2b show, there was a steep increase of violent conflicts or violent cases due to the regime change in Indonesia. The number increased from 75 reported cases between 1990 and 21 May 1998 (authoritarian regime) to 908 reported cases between 21 May 1998 and 23 July 2001 (early stage of democratisation), or to 1,015 reported cases between 21 May 1998 and December 2001 (early stage of democratisation to consolidated stage of democratisation).[12]

Table 2a. Number of Reported Violent Conflicts/Cases in Indonesia 1990-1998

No	Violence Issues	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998
1.	Ethnic, Religion, Migration	-	2	3	5	1
2.	May Riot	-	-	-	-	6
3.	Food Riot	-	-	-	-	22
4.	Political Views	-	-	1	8	-
5.	Competing Resources	-	-	-	1	-
6.	*Dukun Santet*	-	-	-	-	1

[12] Due to data availability, reported incidences during the Megawati regime were counted until the end of 2001. During Megawati's regime until the present Yudoyono's regime, it is generally known that the number of violent incidents decreased, except for separatist violence in Aceh (2003-2004).

7.	Civil Commotion	-	-	-	1	-
8.	Other Communal Violence	-	-	-	-	-
9.	Separatist	-	-	2	-	-
10.	State-Community	2	-	1	2	17
11.	Industrial Relations	1	-	1	1	-
	Sub-Total	3	2	8	15	47
	Grand Total	75				

Table 2b. Number of Reported Violent Conflicts/Cases in Indonesia 1998-2001

No	Violence Issues	**1998***	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	2001*
1.	Ethnic, Religion, Migration	9	87	90	22	11
2.	May Riot	-	-	-	-	-
3.	Food Riot	1	-	-	-	-
4.	Political Views	10	24	20	10	6
5.	Competing Resources	3	8	6	-	1
6.	*Dukun Santet*	11	2	14	-	-
7.	Civil Commotion	11	19	31	3	5
8.	Other Communal Violence	1	1	3	5	-
9.	Separatist	9	135	206	74	76
10.	State-Community	15	12	23	9	7
11.	Industrial Relations	8	14	9	3	1
	Sub-Total	78	302	402	126	107
	Grand Total	908				107

- 1990, 1992, 1994: no reported cases found in Tadjoeddin's database.
- 1998*: since 21 May 1998 (Habibie's appointment as President);
- 2001*: since 23 July 2001 (Megawati's appointment as President). To avoid double counting, violent incidents in the year 1998 (without asterisk) are counted until 20 May 1998, and those of 2001 (without asterisk) are until 22 July 2001.
- May Riot was the riots in May 1998, prior to the fall of Soeharto (21 May 1998).
-*Dukun Santet*: persons "believed to be able to harm or kill others through evil magic or witchcraft" (Tadjoeddin 2002).
Source: Compiled and adapted from Tadjoeddin (2002) with data sources of Indonesian News Agency *(Antara)*, *Kompas, Tempo, Media Indonesia, Republika, 1990-2001*. Additional data: Apakabar 1997, ICG (2001), Sudiono (2000).

As far as East Kalimantan is concerned, there was only one reported case prior to the collapse of the Soeharto regime and six reported cases during post-Soeharto's rule in this province (see Table 3). This was a lower incident rate compared to that of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan, although the population of East

Kalimantan Dayaknese is substantial.[13] In these two provinces (West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan) the reported cases increased from five to 13 cases and from one to 15 cases respectively (see Table 3). It is important to note that one reported case in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan could last for some days (daily fighting), depending on the type of violenceor the geographical location of the violence (see Tadjoeddin 2002). Other differences were the number of casualties and parties involved. In terms of casualties, while East Kalimantan violence resulted in no deaths (at least 37 people injured), in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan the death toll reached figures between hundreds and thousands (Tadjoeddin 2002; *Inside Indonesia*, June-July 2000; ICG 2001). In terms of parties involved, while the East Kalimantan violence was characterised by state-society violence and society-company violence,[14] in West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan the violence was characterised as communal violence[15] involving Dayaknese/Malay vs. Madurese

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[13] Although contemporary Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) is a multi-ethnic island, its identity is highly associated with the indigenous community of the Dayaknese, particularly in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan (South Kalimantan population is dominated by Banjarese). As Indonesia's official statistics does not count ethnic identity, the exact numbers of Dayak people in the island are not known. However, ethnic composition can be estimated by tracing the history, religious faith, language, etc. McKinnon assessed that a minimum of one third (33%) of the total population of Borneo (Indonesians and Malaysians) is Dayaknese (in Lahajir 2001). In West Kalimantan, it was estimated that the Dayak people made up 41 percent of the population while indigenous Malay made up 34 percent (ICG 2001). A rough calculation based on religious faiths by the Central Kalimantan government in 1979 accounted that 60 percent of the population were Dayaknese while 40 percent were non-Dayaknese (Setwilda Tingkat I Kalimantan Tengah 1991). In East Kalimantan it is generally known that the ethnic composition is relatively equal among the five major ethnic groups—Dayaknese, Malays (Kutai, Pasir, Bulungan, Berau, Tidung, etc), Javanese, Banjarese, and Buginese—where the Dayak people constitute about 20 percent of total population (van Klinken 2002).

[14] One case during the New Order era (just before the fall of Soeharto) was the clash between Mulawarman University students and the security apparatus (state-society conflict). Other cases reported during the post-Soeharto era were: the burning of companies' offices, facilities, and equipment in [1] Tanjung Isuy, West Kutai; [2] Long Apari, West Kutai; [3] Sesayap, (formerly) Bulungan (competing resource violence), the clash between [4] the masses and the security apparatus in (formerly) sub-district police of Malinau, Bulungan (state-society violence), [5] between Mulawarman University students and the security apparatus in Samarinda) (state-society violence); and [6] between workers and the security apparatus/Vico Oil Company in Muara Badak, Kutai Kertanegara (industrial relation violence).

[15] This does not necessarily mean to neglect the presence of state-society violence such as clashes between the security apparatus (police, military) and demonstrators (see Tadjoeddin 2002). Rather, the conflict was dominated by ethnic violence during the course of conflict. In addition, state-society violence was implicated by communal violence (e.g. the security apparatus' attempts to protect Madurese, state buildings, etc).

(West Kalimantan) and Dayaknese vs. Madurese (Central Kalimantan).[16] Overall, albeit such differences, violent incidences were on the rise also in East Kalimantan during the post-Soeharto regime (see Table 3).

Table 3. Number of Reported Violent Conflicts/Cases in Kalimantan 1990-2001*

No.	Year	West K.	Central K.	South K.	East K.	Total
1.	1996	2	-	-		
2.	1997	3+	-	1++		8
3.	1998	-	1	-	1	
4.	**1998***	1	-	-	1	

[16] To a certain extent, the rise of the ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan during Indonesia's democratic transition was a demonstration effect of the West Kalimantan ethnic conflict. As the proportion of Dayaknese was substantial in East Kalimantan, in March 2001 many "feared these might play a role as destructive as that in Central Kalimantan" (van Klinken 2002). But why did West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan conflicts not spread to East Kalimantan? A mainstream argument explaining this was due to the equal ethnic composition among major ethnic groups in East Kalimantan (Dayaknese, Malays, Javanese, Banjarese, Buginese). I argue this argument is too simplistic. First, the conflict was not between two major ethnic groups. In West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan, the conflict mainly took place between Dayaknese and Madurese, where Madurese population was very small compared to Dayaknese (West Kalimantan: Madurese 2.5%: Dayaknese 41%; Central Kalimantan: 6-7%:60%). In East Kalimantan, the population of Dayaknese is about 20%, while Madurese proportion is far less than that of West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan. Thus, in terms of proportion of the (potential) conflicting parties, the number of people of one conflicting party (or potential conflicting party) (Dayaknese) outperformed the other (Madurese). The rise of conflict depends on many factors, such as historical factors (ancient hatred), local politics, the roles of elites, and so on. Second, during the rise of the Central Kalimantan conflict, some East Kalimantan Dayak groups had received a call to "prepare themselves" (red bowl tradition—"a porcelain or clay bowl containing rice, leaves, and water coloured by chicken or other blood…passed from village to village as a call to arms," *Inside Indonesia*, No. 51 July-September 1997), if the situation in Central Kalimantan deteriorated, particularly among Central Kalimantan people (Anon, Interview, March 2002). During high tensions in the Central Kalimantan, most, if not all, Madurese resided in Long Bagun sub-district left the area (Anon, Interview, March 2002) as Long Bagun was relatively close to Central Kalimantan and many Central Kalimantan people resided or visited this area. According to van Klinken's study, it was due to local politics and the role of the elites that the conflict in Central Kalimantan did not spread to East Kalimantan (van Klinken 2002). Finally, in 1981 there existed ethnic conflict involving Dayaknese and Buginese in Long Iram, East Kalimantan. This conflict cost tens of lives. Some key informants even accounted that more than one hundred people died (Anon, 2001-2002; for the documentation of this conflict, see *Suara Karya*, 21 March 1981). Although this ethnic conflict did not involve Madurese, but Buginese, it still showed that an argument on the equal proportion of ethnic groups is not convincing. This is the case as the proportion of Buginese and Dayaknese in East Kalimantan is relatively equal.

5.	**1999**	8	-	-	2	
6.	**2000**	1	3	-	3	34
7.	**2001**	3	12	-		
8.	2001*	2	-	-		2

- K. stands for Kalimantan.
+ Pontianak's medical sources revealed that between 1,500-2,000 people had been killed during the clashes (*Inside Indonesia*, No. 51 July-September 1997).
++ Violence during the 1997 election campaign (differing political views) in Banjarmasin. The violence took place for some days and caused 124-133 deaths, 84 injuries, and damaged/burnt numerous buildings (including supermarket).
- 1990-1995: no reported cases found in Tadjoeddin's database.
-1998: 1 January-20 May 1998; 1998*: 21 May-31 December 1998; 2001: 1 January-22 July 2001; 2001*: 23 July-31 December 2001. See notes in Table 2a/2b.
Source: See Table 2a/2b.

To sum up, the regime change from authoritarian state power to democratic state power led to an increase of violent conflicts in Indonesia (including East Kalimantan). The violence steeply increased during the democratic transition period (21 May 1998-23 July 2001), and then decreased during the process of democratic consolidation (23 July 2001-present). Based on such evidence and general observation of the conflict/violence from 23 July 2001 to the present time (democratic consolidation), the violent conflicts or cases still persisted but considerably decreased, except for the Aceh separatist violence in 2003-2004 due to the promulgation of the martial law in 2003, a euphemism for the declaration of war against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) fighters.

E. How Doest It Work?

What is the mechanism of the relationship between institutional breakdown and the rise of conflicts? It is undoubtedly that the rise of violent conflicts during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation was a result of the attacks or actions of certain groups, communities, and crowd to state apparatus and its allies, government's symbols (government buildings, Golkar, etc), other community groups, or perceived enemies and oppressors. Since the actions were carried out collectively, they were collective action. The question is why did the people bravely stage collective action against other community groups (horizontal conflict) and the state and its symbols (vertical conflict) after regime change? The findings suggested that this was strongly associated with a change in political environment due to regime change/democratisation at a national level. This new political environment—characterised by a sort of institutional vacuum and lawlessness—provided political opportunities to act and to succeed in achieving collective goals.

As far as the political opportunities to stage collective action are concerned, as rational human beings, individuals would compare the costs or risks in advancing

such opportunities. If the costs or risks are high they would not tend to act; if low, they would tend to act (cf. Olson 1971). The costs or risks here refer to political costs or risks (apprehension, interrogation, detention, disappearance, etc), which would not only bear individually but also communally.

Institutional breakdown affected the nature of political risks. The abandoning of dual function and security approach institutions caused the security apparatus could no longer apply the repressive New Order approach to people's dissent or confrontations. Security personnel at all levels became reluctant to act as they had in the past, when they, particularly the military, had committed human rights violations. At the same time, the people required the military to act differently from the way they had acted during the New Order era. For instance, they no longer accepted that the military should back Golkar, conglomerates, and the company. The people used a popular phrase "Nowadays it's the *reformasi* era, Sir!" to remind the security apparatus to act differently. Results of my interviews with security apparatus suggest that *"reformasi"* was a powerful word during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation, and that the security apparatus were fearful of being branded as anti-*reformasi* if they used the New Order style of handling the people (Anon.1, Interview, 15 May 2002). Thus, soon after the fall of Soeharto, the security apparatus (particularly the military) no longer dared to act arbitrarily, compared to the way they had acted in the New Order era (Anon.2, Interview, March 2002).

These new developments—the security apparatus' unwillingness to act and the people's newfound braveness—caused the security apparatus to be paralysed in its relation with the masses, particularly in facing any mass gatherings of the post-New Order era. In this situation, security risks in staging or undertaking certain actions decreased steeply the wake of Soeharto's fall. The decrease of risks brought about the mushrooming of *laissez-faire* behaviour in many parts of Indonesia. This led to widespread conflicts during the democratic transition period.

With regard to New Order's repressive bureaucratic institutions, the collapse of these institutions brought about the absence of bureaucracy-related punishment mechanisms. Hence, soon after regime change the bureaucracy could no longer control the bureaucrats, civil servants and their families, village heads and their people, and so on. This loss of control made the risks to deviate from "common wisdoms" low. In this situation, the masses would be easily mobilised to attack or to take revenge against the remnants of the New Order and their perceived allies. Unfortunately, the people also expressed their anger by destroying government's infrastructures and other public facilities. Accordingly, many violent incidents were reported against the state apparatus and its allies as well as government's symbols.

In views of the mass depoliticisation institution, due to the abandonment of this institution, government officials and security apparatus were no longer able to use Golkar as a political arm to control the people and to undermine people's

movement. In fact, during this transitional period, the people enjoyed their newly acquired freedoms without many risks. To make matter "worse", they acted at a much higher level of energy than formerly, fuelled by the euphoria of *reformasi,* to the extent that most of them became very aggressive. As lawlessness existed, the people were inclined to act in their own ways. During the 1999 election campaigns, for instance, Golkar became the target of embarrassments, humiliations, and violence in many parts of the archipelago. Increasing communal conflicts were also reported by mass media. Therefore, the number of violent incidents increased.

Thus, abrupt regime change from the New Order authoritarian regime to the post-New Order democratic regime caused a sudden breakdown of the New Order anti-conflict machines. Without a quick presence of their acceptable successors (institutions), such collapse or breakdown created a sort of institutional vacuum as well as lawlessness, particularly during the period of early democratisation or democratic transition. This situation increased opportunities for the repressed or neglected people to act, and reduced the risks to take action. This is why the people were inclined to be easily mobilised by their elites—including opportunistic elites— to challenge and stage unilateral actions against the perceived enemies.

F. Conclusion

This work has examined the rise of conflicts during Indonesia's early stage of democratisation from the perspective institutional analysis. It is obvious that the collapse of Soeharto's regime followed by democratisation had a great impact on Indonesian politics, particularly the political situation.

A phenomenon commonly observed during periods of regime change or early stage of democratisation was also observed in the Indonesian case, that is, the breakdown of political institutions, particularly the repressive political institutions. During the New Order regime, repressive political institutions—the repressive security institution, the repressive bureaucracy institution, and the mass depoliticisation institution (floating mass)—had been used as anti-conflict machines to deal with people's dissents. For a long period of time, these institutions had successfully prevented the emergence of many potential conflicts. After the collapse of the New Order authoritarian regime, these repressive institutions collapsed or were abolished. The collapse of authoritarian anti-conflict mechanisms without the presence of new viable political institutions during the democratic transition period created a kind of institutional vacuum as well as lawlessness.

This situation provided opportunities to the so far repressed masses and to the opportunistic elites to advance their concerns and interests without many restrictions or impediments. As the costs or risks to advance such opportunities—opportunity costs or opportunity risks—are low and even none, many community groups were

easily mobilised to take unilateral actions against their rivals, enemies, and perceived enemies and oppressors. Hence, conflicts were inevitably on the rise.

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